General Strike Day X Updates

Demonstrations are going on with great reduction in traffic in the Nepal’s capital

By UWB! Team

The rally at Kalanki. Photo by Shaligram Tiwari.

[6:25PM] The massive rally at Teku bridge were dispersed by police with more than a dozen rounds of tear-gas shells. The rally that began at Gongabu collected people on its way to Kalanki to Balkhu to Sanepa before it attempted to envade the restricted area throuhg Teku Bridge at Pachali.

The demonstrators nearly broke the shield of hundreds of policemen stationed at the bridge but the police used tear-gas to disperse them. A few of the rallyist however moved to Teku road and gathered there chanting slogans. They turned to Kalimati after large number of police arrived there.

There were more than 20,000 demonstrators in the rally. Even the hundreds of Armed Police Force (APF) at Kalanki couldn’t stop them and just ensured that they don’t enter the city area leaving the Ring Road and let it move towards Balkhu.

[3:25PM] Traffic in Koteshwor and Baneshwor area is almost non-existent.

Rally at Kaushaltar resumed at 11:00 AM and the demonstrators rallied the Kaushaltar, Ghatthaghar, Thimi and Lokanthali area. A lot of women pariticipated in the rally at around 12:00 noon. The demonstrators are either rallying or sitting on the road.

Photos By Rajaram Gautam

At 8:00AM in Kalanki, a massive crowd gathered to listen student leader Gagan Thapa’s speech. He said during ongoing movement, Kalanki’s people had participated overwhelmingly. He thanked them and asked them to take their spirit to the core of the city.

[10:40AM] A rally of Seven Party Alliance (SPA) closed down the Arniko Highway at Kaushaltar area. The rally participated by around 1000 demonstrators rallied from Kaushaltar to Thimi and back to Lokanthali was closely watched and followed by hundreds of policemen but didn’t intervene.

Bhaktapur is closed also because of the Bisket Festival which is one of the biggest festivals in Thimi and Bhaktapur. The rally has now ended but it’s scheduled to resume at 11:00AM.

At Patan and Kathmandu, the number of public vehicles on road is almost nil whereas a few motorbikes and private vehicles are plying on the road. The traffic on Saturdays is usually less.

The demonstrators had done some vandalizing works in the Chakrapath area, including Gongabu, last night but no details are available.

Published by UWB

Pioneering blog from Nepal...since 2004.

129 thoughts on “General Strike Day X Updates

  1. Further,
    If you have the tendency to attack the individual without adressing the argument at all due to lack of credible counter argument, then why should the rest of us not know about this “individual attacker’s” personal history as well.

  2. Bravo,
    To clarify, as you write:
    “Neither I can play cricket better than Ganguli nor that Guy become a leader of nepal. It does not imply that we should stop commenting about them….”
    Yes, but you do play at least a little cricket and understand the game, nd more importantly, you are commenting on the cricketing ability of Ganguly and not Ganguly himself.

  3. More Marks:(excerpt from an article written before the SPAM movement)

    The situation is now at an interesting spot. From the insurgent standpoint, united fronts are always a preferable way of waging people’s war, because they are less dangerous for the insurgents. No one in the Maoist movement wants to die (that’s for Salafist fanatics seeking Paradise!). As to how matters will play themselves out on the ground, chaos already bears witness to how effective united fronts can be — the system dies the death of the thousand cuts.

    As always, the task at hand is to discern insurgent intentions. Bhattarai, in particular, has taken me to task (in Nepali) for misstating Maoist intentions. I think the point is rather, as above, that I have very accurately rendered just what the Maoists say to themselves and to the public. We only differ in that they claim what they say represents the legitimate forces of history.

    The Maoists are portraying themselves as having had a change of heart. That is not true at all: they have simply chosen to lead with a different combination, to fall back upon a boxing metaphor.

    What are they actually doing? During the “ceasefire,” they did not stop preparing for war by training and stockpiling. This is entirely logical, because they see violence and nonviolence as complementary, just as did the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in its famous maxim that it would fight with a ballot in one hand, an Armalite in the other.

    It may be recalled that when the PIRA moved to emphasize the ballot, the question was whether the shift was “real.” The intelligence was very mixed. On the one hand, significant steps were taken that indicated a PIRA willingness to participate peacefully in politics. On the other hand, there were serious actions that demonstrated the armed option was not being foreclosed (such as working with FARC in Colombia).

    In the event, the strength of the state and the willingness of the insurgents to reintegrate produced a tenuous peace. Neither of those factors is present in the Nepali case. To the contrary, in the Irish case, “reintegration” was the end-state. In Nepal, the Maoists are offering the terms of surrender – and stating baldly that they intend to try the monarch when he submits his neck to the block.

    Though they claim they are willing to accept the outcome of a vote on the future shape of the system, they refuse to allow political action that would create a level playing field. Instead, as the Sandinistas did in Nicaragua, they state, having altered the playing field and gained armed control of the areas which will produce the vote, they will allow “peaceful measures” to hold sway.

    Though the Maoists state they will participate in the system if they lose a referendum on its future shape, there are two critical sticking points that make it unlikely such will happen.

    First, it does not appear even the Maoist leadership could simply order the local elements of the movement to “go back inside the system.”

    Second, all Maoist internal discourse is predicated upon a belief that the present, united front course will deliver victory at less cost than the alternative, “violence leads,” course. It is most unlikely a campaign setback (defeat in the united front effort) would lead to renunciation of the strategic approach (people’s war), because the other campaign elements offer ways to continue the struggle.

    Indeed, this is what the members of the insurgency itself are being told. The cadres are stating that victory is at hand, that the united front alliance (common action with the political parties) will lead to a victory march in Kathmandu. They are being told that the present course is the best way “to get what we want.”

    The movement, in other words, is on Maoist auto-pilot: its strategy has not changed, only emphasized a different campaign element (or “weapons system,” if you like). Violence and nonviolence are still just two sides of the same coin.

    Dr. Thomas A. Marks is a political risk consultant based in Honolulu, Hawaii and a frequent visitor to Nepal. He has authored a number of benchmark works on Maoist insurgency.

  4. Mark is saying nothing differen that what present government is saying..but i would also like to see his article (if any) after the start of the movement..his opinion might have been changed as US theory has also seemed to be changing these days.

  5. Posted by Scoop

    Girija said,”The King has got the army and the there is the Maoists on the other side, so we are nowhere right now. I think to come out of this situation as winners and support for the parties we need to have 4-5 newars killed in the valley and blame it on one or the other of the two (King or Maoists).”

    What do you want Scoop? what the hell Girija said and what the hell he does, who cares? who knows? Newars are not mad as you think my fren,Newars are not interested in this idiot skrikes. why should we believe in Girija? world knows his frustrated mind doen’t work anymore now. Do you want to be hired this country by India?why are you paying attention to him? [icd]

  6. Perhaps I have not read enough of his articles but this Mark just seems to highlight Maoists strategies and SPA’s follies in working with them. A lot of what he says makes sense I agree. I really detest the Maoists and would never trust them. But does this Mark have any comments on why such a situation exists in Nepal and what the present government must do to tackle this problem? Or is he just full of doom and gloom?

  7. See the previous article posted way above by ug frm papua called: EXPLAINING MAOIST STRATEGY: IT’S ALL IN THE SCRIPT, for his thought’s after the movement on the streets.
    Check out the opinion pages for other articles by him and thoughts on his approach.

  8. See article posted way above by ug frm papua called: EXPLAINING MAOIST STRATEGY: IT’S ALL IN THE SCRIPT, for his thought’s after the movement on the streets.
    Check out the opinion pages for other articles by him and thoughts on his approach.

    Here’s one:
    It’s all a matter of politics

    By Dr. Thomas A. Marks

    Counterinsurgency as a term has meaning only if one considers its target, insurgency. In the latter, an armed political movement attempts to seize control of the state or to separate from it. Therefore, the response – counterinsurgency – must also be an armed political movement.

    Just as any political campaign makes use of many tools, so does insurgency. And so must counterinsurgency use all elements of state power in order to restore balance to that which has gone awry.

    Post-Cold War Insurgency

    Insurgency, to fall back upon a useful definition advanced by Larry Cable, is “the armed expression of organic disaffiliation.” Yet a series of shifts in the post-Cold War world has dramatically affected most, if not all, insurgencies:

    ● The end of generalized state support has left insurgent movements struggling financially and logistically to ensure that supply meets demand in the actual making of internal war. Movements which continue to enjoy external largess are a minority. Self-sustaining insurgencies have become potent only to the extent they have been able to tap sources (of support) external to the target population (e.g., FARC’s taxing of the drug trade, LTTE’s tapping of the Tamil diaspora communities).

    Those movements which have not found such sources normally have remained weak (e.g., the CPP Maoists in the Philippines, or the various Maoist movements in India). There are always exceptions, where unique circumstances alter the playing field. This is what we see in Nepal. There, India’s actions against the present Nepali state have been an important factor in making both the political opposition and the Maoists (the so-called SPAM) more powerful than objective circumstances would predict.

    ● This reality accounts for the present very mixed character of so many movements. In the past, external assistance provided ideologically and operationally viable movements (e.g., the Viet Cong in South Vietnam) with the critical margin that allowed focus upon ideological ends. Now, insurgencies must devote extraordinary amounts of time to criminal activity. This has created the “gang-like” behavior so typical of many movements, such as the Nepalese Maoists. The challenge: how to squeeze blood from the turnip?

    What the state terms extortion and kidnapping, the Maoists call “revolutionary taxation.” A small shopkeeper in the hills, for instance, will be taxed NR 50 per month, a salaried teacher NR 200. But kidnapping these same individuals and getting their families to come up with their life’s savings will produce a ransom of NR 30,000. Demands from urban businesses or infrastructure development projects (funded from abroad) are much higher.

    ● At issue remains the question of balance. Engaging in criminal behavior has never been atypical of insurgencies; the behavior merely has been kept subordinate to larger ends. A movement which effectively turns its back upon its target population, which becomes mainly or wholly a criminal enterprise, is no longer an insurgency. The Maoists have not reached this point, but in certain areas they have come dangerously close.

    ● Just as the relationship between various insurgent movements and their mass base has shifted, so has the “negotiated” quality of many movements changed. The implicit bargain reached — between the ideological designs of leadership and the “solve my grievances” demands of followers — has been altered. The result is an absence of the “checks and balances” provided by the imperative that “the fish to swim in the sea.” The scales have been tipped dramatically in favor of the leaders. Their insurgencies consequently are able to function far more as alternative, violent political organizations in being rather than as armed protest movements.

    We see this prominently in the present character of the CPN(M). The combatants and the mass base do not know even the most minor detail about Maoism (one could argue that this includes district level cadres). Yet it is Maoism that animates the strategy and plans of the upper leadership. They simply deny that such an ideology has produced tragedy everywhere it has been tried throughout history. They claim all Nepal’s problems will be solved in the new order, and that is good enough for the “grievance guerrillas” who are their followers.

    ● Extreme voluntarism, therefore, has become not the exception but the norm in insurgencies worldwide. To the extent that particular socio-economic-political circumstances allow foco-like behavior to mobilize a following, there is the appearance of insurgent strength. Where such conditions are absent, terror has been used with increasing frequency to propel movements along. It is terror that has been essential to the Maoist mass mobilization effort in Nepal, with kidnapping of the young the key element at present. It is significant that this kidnapping – the ultimate obscenity, seizing the young – is all but ignored by international human rights organizations.

    A point must be highlighted: The issue in insurgency is never the use of terror. Terror is integral to insurgency. Hence the issue is one of balancing its use within a larger political framework.

    What is Counterinsurgency?

    What should be obvious is that counterinsurgency strategy must also be armed politics. The security forces serve as a shield for reform. In doing so, the state implements a strategy that is correct and sustainable.

    · A correct approach will balance elimination of grievances (i.e., the state will carry out reform) and security force action that eliminates the insurgents (i.e., repression). The security forces provide the protection necessary for the restoration (or implementation) of government presence and control.

    · A sustainable approach is defined by the state itself. It must be willing to bear the human and fiscal cost of the approach it seeks to implement.

    With a correct and sustainable approach in place, the counterinsurgent “plays for the breaks,” those shifts in the internal or external situation that work against the insurgent and favor the state. This normally involves an extended period of time, a “protracted war.”

    This makes it difficult for democracies to sustain counterinsurgent campaigns, particularly in the present world-environment where there is little agreement upon strategic ends and means, much less operational and tactical concerns. The very steps they must take to protect themselves, as we have seen in Nepal, can produce unintended consequences.

    Further, states, like individuals, are clumsy and make mistakes. A multitude of single-issue actors are now on the playing field (e.g., human rights groups) whose primary focus is condemning the errors of the state, not the insurgents. Indeed, since they effectively have no influence over the insurgents, the state becomes their sole target. Nepal has emerged as one of the premier post-Cold War illustrations.

    States which have successfully engaged in counterinsurgency have addressed the two elements above by using the security forces (armed forces and police) to restore local security so that the socio-economic-political functions of government and society can thrive. Commitment of human and fiscal resources has been at sustainable levels.

    In playing for the breaks, a state seeks a “tipping point,” to use present strategic phraseology. But this term does not capture the essence contained in “playing for the breaks,” because “tipping point” implies that the counterinsurgency itself produces a turn in the battle. In reality, it sets in place a set of conditions which, when the wind shifts, allow the troubled ship of state to exploit the new direction and achieve a settlement.

    Politics Holds the Key

    Salient illustrations of particular relevance to the Nepali case are briefly discussed below. They are selected since they all involve “people’s war,” though of different traditions:

    ● Thailand, 1965-83. A Maoist movement inspired by the Chinese, the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), grew steadily from its 1965 “declaration of people’s war until, in the aftermath of October 1976 popular upheaval crushed by the state, it decided the time was ripe to denounce all elements of the “old order,” to include the venerated monarchy. A pro-monarchy popular backlash resulted in mushrooming local defense that swamped CPT manpower. This occurred even as a correct and sustainable government counterinsurgency approach – emphasizing creating viable democracy behind the shield provided by the security forces – was implemented by new post-1976 leadership.

    Simultaneously, geopolitical shifts put the CPT’s important Chinese and Vietnamese/Lao supporters at odds and jeopardized major supply sources/base areas. The combination resulted in a virtual implosion of the movement over the next six years, despite the massive manpower gains that had been realized post-1976. The CPT has effectively vanished from the Thai political scene. U.S. aid was important in the pre-1976 period but largely irrelevant to actual playing out of post-1976 events.

    ● Philippines, 1968-93. A Maoist movement also inspired by the Chinese but also the Vietnamese, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), grew steadily from its “reconstitution” and declaration of people’s war in 1968 (the previous communist insurgency having been decimated in the so-called Huk Rebellion in the early 1950s). Inefficient, corrupt, and repressive martial law, declared in 1972, served as the major recruiting tool for the insurgency; but this cause vanished when the dictator called a snap election, was caught trying to rig it, and was forced to flee the country amidst the so-called “Edsa Revolution” of February 1986.

    Reform leadership instituted a correct and sustainable counterinsurgency approach, using the security forces as the shield behind which democracy was restored at all levels of the polity. Misjudging events completely, the CPP opted for increased terrorism at the very moment the population was re-entering the democratic system. The result was wholesale desertion of the mass base, the major source of insurgent funding, large enlistment in local defense organizations, and virtual implosion of the movement over the course of the next six years, despite all its efforts to halt the process. Subsequent government errors have allowed the CPP to again revive its fortunes. U.S. aid was important throughout the case.

    ● Peru, 1980-96. A Maoist movement inspired by the extreme radicalism of the Chinese “Gang of Four,” Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) spent some 17 years organizing and using terrorism before its 1980 declaration of people’s war. Financing itself principally through the coca trade, and using an ever greater proportion of terror in its approach, it had brought Peruvian democracy to its knees by 1990. That year, election of a political neophyte, Alberto Fujimori, followed by what effectively was a declaration of a controversial national state of emergency in 1992, resulted in a correct and sustainable counterinsurgency approach. Empowering local democracy and carrying out a highly effective program of micro-development cut support for Sendero even as its terrorism unleashed a popular backlash. The population demanded the right to protect itself from insurgent terrorism.

    Generally advanced as the key action was the capture of the Shining Path leader, Guzman, in 1992. Equally critical, however, was the capture of master cadre lists that allowed the virtual decapitation of the entire movement (some 400 high-level arrests) at a time when civil society was again beginning to flourish. The result was wholesale desertion of the mass base, massive enlistment in local defense organizations in key insurgent base areas, and virtual implosion of the movement over the course of the next three years. Corruption in his entourage led to Fujimori being forced from the country even though he was actually the victor in the 2000 elections. Shining Path remains active as a remnant. U.S. aid played a major role in counter-narcotics and intelligence, essentially no role in the mechanics of counterinsurgency.

    ● El Salvador, 1979-91. A populist coalition, Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), was formed in 1980 and followed people’s war doctrine in an effort to oust an authoritarian, corrupt, inefficient, repressive regime. Communist elements of the FMLN coalition controlled strategy but found themselves confronted by a societal/political transformation carried out within the larger framework of U.S. assistance. Acting consciously upon lessons learned in Vietnam, U.S. personnel facilitated democratic transition and socio-economic reform. A key factor was the presence of a small US advisory group that was effective in building professionalism within the El Salvadoran armed forces.

    The counterinsurgency instituted was both correct and sustainable. Access to supplies and sanctuary in communist Nicaragua (which itself was supported by the Soviet bloc) nevertheless sustained a relatively intense level of FMLN activities that included two major insurgent offensives, 1979 and 1989. In response, US support of Nicaragua’s own insurgency (which exploded as the regime dogmatically pursued Marxist-Leninism) not only damaged the supply links to the FMLN but eventually forced the Sandinistas to hold elections (which they lost overwhelmingly). The collapse of the Soviet bloc, combined with mutual exhaustion of the main parties in El Salvador, resulted in negotiations that produced an enduring democratic peace, formally implemented beginning in 1992.

    In these four illustrations, legitimacy – actualized as democracy and popular sovereignty – was the key ingredient. The center of gravity for the insurgents in each case was mass support, built by a combination of winning allegiance and terrorizing opposition.

    Counter-mobilization by the state was only possible when reform strengthened democracy. Practice of popular sovereignty exposed the hollowness of insurgent “people’s democracy.” Political reform, then, carried out within a grid of security, was the key in each case.

    Such must be the case in Nepal.

    (Dr. Thomas A. Marks is a political risk consultant based in Honolulu, Hawaii and a frequent visitor to Nepal. He has authored a number of benchmark works on Maoist insurgency.

  9. thanks tm.

    This Mark guy makes sense. Wonder if KG will go for the reforms needed to give to the people the ‘true democracy’ which would negate the Maoists politcal strategy. So far the answer is no. But here’s hoping.

  10. Hello cs.
    Don´t discredit the author, you say. Well, that is just what you do, my friend, when you try to comment on Michael van de Veer`s postings. Michael works for a radiostation in Hawaii, KKCR (click on the link!). Yes, he lives in Hawaii, AS DOES MISTER T.A. MARKS. So he may know a little more than you do when it comes to the whereabouts of CIA-agent Marks. Mister Marks is working for US government just google the guy. On the other hand, cs (and tm), you won´t do that, why should you? From what you write you are clearly royalist.

  11. Hey ola,

    Don’t forget even the CIA backed Mark has said that a successful counter insurgency is only possible if democracy is strengthened via reform and popular sovereignty is practised. So if the royalists are using Mark’s comments to support their cause they are fools because they haven’t understood what Mark is advocating-a functioning democracy.

  12. Dr. Thomas A. Marks, a former US Government officer, is an Adjunct Professor at the US Joint Special Operations University, Hurlburt Field, Florida, and a consultant for several firms specializing in political risk and personal security, including RAND, where he is a member of the Insurgency Board.
    goto this link to know more about RAND

    These royalist have got nothing and they would hug a porcupine if it says something that seems like a support for their master….wake up and understand what he means and if you want to read this man’s comment of Maoist And Nepal goto this link

  13. Ola,

    I’m just giving voice to a person who is not present in this forum. Yes I attacked the individual, as he attacked the individual as well. So you do get my point and know how it feels. If someone attacks the individual and not the argument, he/she deserves the same treatment.
    Hawaii is a pretty big place. I doubt Dr. Marks and Vandeveer dine together.
    As for Kirat, again with the royalist blabber. Putting sense to the situtation and differeing from your views does not qualify one as a royalist.
    Ola, ask the editors of as to the way to write to Dr. Marks. Have you not been following what has been said?

  14. proudtobnepali,

    Again trying to attack the individual and not approaching the article. Let us have your history and biodata as well. Lal Salaaam comrade.

  15. rastafaria,
    you have been puffing too much of it. so i refuse to respond to you.

    you are saying people will chose the next leader? do you know the people in Nepal dont get to chose their life partner when they are to get married. and you are talking about chosing the prime minister/leader. wake up folks!!

  16. I see many references to the past 250 years in comparison to the last 16 years. If the last 16 years was corrupt they say how about the past 250 years. What are we discussing here? How can we compare apples and oranges? What about before 250 years for that matter,when we did’nt even exist as one country, should we start blaming the Europeans for colonising the world for the failure of the past 16 years, or Genghis Khan for conquering Asia, or the Mughals for taking the sub continent. People who follow this line of argument which I don’t, should also then be grateful to Prithvi Narayan Shah for giving us a country at all. But even this is an out of context argument. Why the hell ahould we compare the past 16 years of democratic government, where we the people were supposed to be heard and the representatives were chosen by us, (and they still screwed us majorly), with a time where not only Nepal but most of the world was under governments of autocracy, colononism and rule by force and the might of the gun. Europeans had empires then. And for those eras, that is what the politics was, and politics evolved to the systems we see in the world today. Instead of learning from the best, the past 16 years gave us democracy but the worst of it. Hopefully we can salvage the best of it in the future.

  17. I get what tt. is saying but I think the last 250 years have used to indicate what king’s rule will be like if he is not made to step down.

  18. tt
    maybe i should answer u on philosophical than religious ground.
    ‘everything matters everything” ..only the question is about how intense and dilute the effect is.
    everything has their energy fields-our words, thoughts and actions and they are having their effects.
    colonisation of mughals crippled india, that gave them british colonisation which helped our rana rulers. restoration of freedom in india helped restoration of nepal’s freedom…

    We had brought democracy, but our nation being crippled by 250 years of autocratic shah-rana rule was too weak to make the jump.
    We had to reform and improve but again it was always attacked monarchy.
    “rajtantra ko kaalo chhayaa” and “panchayatko bhoot” le sadhai hamro democracylai prahar garirahyo.
    india’s democracy was also young and weak but it had no monarchy to obstruct it’s growth, but we unfortunate nepalese had “rajtantrako Ghando” which we had to hang on our neck and which has ultimately strangled us.
    250 years of monarchy has sure contributed in our poverty and underdevelopment and ill-growth of democracy. we have to uproot this monarchy in the first place.

  19. taaya,
    You are just adding ammunition to my argument and going down the slippery slope in this line of thought – So what if the 16 years was corrupt, the Shah Kings have been corrupt for the past 250 years, so it is their fault, oh but wait, before them it is the fault of the colonisers and emperors who conquered the world, but hang on, maybe it is the fault of man for dominating the world and women too. So the last 16 years can be blamed on primitive man fo dominating the world.
    If you want philisophy, there you have it, now why dont we just blame the Greek philosophers for this philosophy as well.

  20. tt,
    what i meant is that all our history too has to be analysed.
    i didn’t mean ki u just blame, there is no beauty in blaming, that’s ‘akarmanyata’… i meant analyse our history, what went wrong, who were wrong..then point that out and get solutions to straighten them.
    history is not to be forgotten but to be read…reread so that we donot walk the same old dreary path.
    i am sure u know that our old philosophies, religious faiths are also questioned and judged.

    what “the da vinci code” is about? hasn’t it unraveled the history, the religion to justify todays oppression.
    History is the greatest lesson after all.

    It is the fault of 16 years , it is the fault of 250 years, it is the fault of the history of mankind.
    We have to identify and straighten all these faults and move ahead.

    But again these 250 years have to be judged very keenly because it is yet not a history , it’s ghost has always been alive behind the curtains and has now come in full action.

    “the one who doesnot know history is the leaf who doesnot know it is the part of the tree.”

  21. taya,
    No one is stopping anyone from analysing history till the cows come home. But if you see my original argument is against those who try to play the blame game. Also, history keeps being re-written, depending on whose in power. As you say “behind the curtains”. So pleae fell free to analyse history, but my argument is not the discussion of history, you missed the point. It is on the trying to compare and trying to give credibility to wrong doings of the recent past to that of the ancient past.
    But like I said we have to learn from the best and practice it and not the other way around.
    As for the Da Vinci code, it’s an enjoyable book, but if no one has pointed it out to you yet, it is a work of fiction.

  22. tt ,of course the book ‘the da vinci code ‘ is a work of fiction. the plot and characters and the story are all fictous. but the issues it has arised (in fact they were always there, the book simply got it more interesting)about religion, gods, sex, art, nature are geniune (i don’t mean all, a lot of imagination and assumptions are there) .
    The main point is that we can not always forget the past, but question our past,our beliefs, our religion, our faith.
    Actually, if u have not understood I want to make u clear that the comparision of 16 years of democracy and 250 years of monarchy is made to answer those blind,partial royalists who can only scold democracy and all the bad things that happened in those 16 years.It is to remind them that 16 years is far better than 250 years.
    It is to make it clear that democracy is far far better than this date expired monarchy.
    I think now u have got my point.

  23. well mr cs u want my biodata
    i am an 18 year old guy just studying in 12….live in bansthali….have a big home…due to which u might think i am some sort of feudal coz people like u have just thinking like this…it was not an attack on any individual…i just gave the description of u’re great article writer who for u seems very pragmatic as all the us government and military guys are….very good in these kind of things…that’s why they made the ussr fall without having to fight with the janata like u…it’s nothing hard to do anything a little charismatic person wants but this country is not composed with only “u’re highness”…this country has also got good people and remeber a thing big old sir….a small candle is enought to ligth pitch darkness to show u the way…..

  24. proud to be Nepali,

    I am so happy that young people like you in nepal are also so much intersted with the politics of nepal…

  25. Does your blog have a contact page? I’m having trouble locating it but, I’d like to shoot you an email.
    I’ve got some ideas for your blog you might be interested
    in hearing. Either way, great website and I look forward to seeing it
    develop over time.

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