American Diplomatic Cable: Indians, Allergic to Police Advisor Reference, Wanted to Change UN Resolution on Mission In Nepal

2007-01-18 12:27

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000104

SIPDIS
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/INS, IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017

TAGS: PREL PGOV NP UN

SUBJECT: NEPAL: INDIANS WANT POLICE ADVISORS,
EXPLOSIVES OUT OF DRAFT UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
——-

¶1. (C) Indian Ambassador Mukherjee requested a meeting with
the Ambassador January 18 to relay New Delhi’s concern with
references in the draft UN Security Resolution (UNSCR) on
Nepal to police advisors as well as the U.S.-proposed clause
on explosive devices. Ambassador Mukherjee said that, while
India would not block the presence of UN police advisors, it
did not want the advisors explicitly mentioned in the
resolution, citing the potential for mission creep and UN
“intrusiveness” in a Nepal-led election process. Mukherjee
also said India preferred that language on mines, improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), and unexploded ordinance be
omitted. These arms management details were already included
in the prior November 28 Agreement on the Management of Arms
and Armies, he said. Ambassador Mukherjee reiterated India’s
goal of a focused and limited UN Mission in Nepal with
ownership of the peace process firmly in the hands of the
Nepali Government. Both Ambassadors agreed that speedy
finalization of a resolution was critical for success of arms
management, and that small details in the draft UNSCR’s
language should not get in the way of its rapid adoption.

Indians Allergic to Police Advisor References
———————————————

¶2. (C) Ambassador Mukherjee requested a meeting with the
Ambassador January 18 to express New Delhi’s concerns about
the draft UNSCR on Nepal pending in New York. Specifically,
he raised Indian concerns with the U.S. request to add a
subparagraph in Para 1(d) on a police advisory component to
the election aspect of the UN mission. He also was
uncomfortable with the proposed UK “compromise” language: “To
provide technical support to the national electoral
authorities for the planning, preparation, and conduct (of
elections), including with regard to security issues.”
Citing the potential for mission creep and UN “intrusiveness”
implicit in this language, Ambassador Mukherjee said Delhi
preferred to retain the original language, “To provide
technical support to the national electoral authorities for
the conduct of elections in a free and fair atmosphere, in
consultation with the parties.” Ambassador Moriarty reminded
Ambassador Mukherjee that in previous meetings Mukherjee had
said that India would not block a small UN police advisory
presence. Ambassador Mukherjee responded that the Indians
still assumed they would be “living with” UN police advisors
in reality, but did not want this component to be a part of
the resolution’s language.

Indians Don’t Want Explosives Mentioned
—————————————

¶3. (C) Ambassador Mukherjee said that New Delhi believed it
was not necessary for the UNSCR to refer to the management of
mines, IEDs, and explosives in the agreement text,
referencing the U.S. proposed language in para 1(a), “To
monitor the management of arms and armed personnel..
including technical assistance with respect to mines,
improvised explosive devices, and unexploded ordinance (Draft
SCR rev 1 – 16 January 2007).” Ambassador Mukherjee and
Ambassador Moriarty agreed that the November 28 Tripartite
Agreement among the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA), Maoists, and
UN on the Management of Arms and Armies made extensive and
explicit reference to the management of explosive devices.
Ambassador Moriarty said that if prior agreements were
referenced in the Resolution’s preamble, language on
explosives might not be necessary in the resolution itself,
particularly if this might hold up the resolution’s passage.

Status of Mission Agreement in Thirty days – Really Necessary?
——————————————— —————-

¶4. (C) Ambassador Mukherjee asked as well whether it was
necessary to include U.S.-proposed language in para 6 of the
draft SCR, “Further requests the Secretary-General and the
Government of Nepal to conclude a status of mission agreement
within 30 days of adoption of this resolution.” Ambassador
Mukherjee said that he had been told that a status of mission
agreement (SOMA) was a standard operating procedure for the
UN and did not need to be explicitly mentioned in the
resolution, adding another timeline to the process. Both
Ambassadors agreed that whether the SOMA language was
included in the resolution should be based on precedent set
in previous and similar SCRs.

Comment
——-

¶5. (C) Ambassador Mukherjee’s requests are not dramatically
at odds with U.S. views on the scope of a UN mission and we
urge SCA, IO, and USUN to consider India’s concerns to ensure
the resolution’s rapid adoption. If a limited number of
police advisors in practice will be accepted by the Indians,
and if the UNSCR recognizes the November 28 Agreement on the
Management of Arms and Armies (which included detailed
provisions related to explosive devices), these vital issues
could still be addressed by the UN Mission. From our
perspective, the need of the hour is for the speedy adoption
of a UNSCR that is robust enough to ensure effective arms
management in the near-term and an environment conducive for
free and fair elections.

MORIARTY