Tag Archives: cablegate

American Cablegate- NEPAL: Indian Ambassador Reports Advances In Bilateral Security Cooperation

Reference ID- 03KATHMANDU1870
Created- 2003-09-25 10:10
Released- 2011-03-15 00:12
Classification- SECRET//NOFORN
Origin- Embassy Kathmandu

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001870

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR SA/INS
NSC FOR MILLARD
LONDON FOR POL – GURNEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2013
TAGS: PREL PTER MCAP PGOV IN NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: INDIAN AMBASSADOR REPORTS ADVANCES IN BILATERAL SECURITY COOPERATION
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1859
¶B. KATHMANDU 1692

Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5(B,D).

——- SUMMARY ——–

¶1. (S/NF) According to Indian Ambassador Shyam Saran, bilateral consultations between Indian and Nepali security and intelligence officers in Kathmandu on Sept 22-23 proceeded “”exceptionally well”” as a first step in institutionalizing security assistance and information exchange between the two governments. The GOI believes it can provide most of Nepal’s requirements for conventional military equipment, according to Saran, and looks to the USG to provide “”high-tech”” equipment. New initiatives include regularizing contacts between the two countries’ respective border security units and GOI training on how to counter urban terrorism. While both Ambassadors agreed that their efforts to promote a reconciliation between the political parties and the Palace had not so far proven successful, Saran reported that the Government of Nepal (GON) is considering holding phased national and local elections in 2004. End summary.

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PROGRESS ON BILATERAL DEFENSE COOPERATION
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¶2. (C) On September 24 Indian Ambassador Shyam Saran called on the Ambassador to brief him on progress achieved during bilateral consultations between Indian and Nepali security and intelligence officials in Kathmandu Sept. 22-23 (Ref A). The initial round of talks went “”exceptionally well,”” Saran reported, characterizing them as the “”most serious and cooperative”” discussions on security, military, and intelligence topics ever between the two neighbors. The next round is expected to be held in New Delhi in November.

¶3. (S/NF) Saran said the talks focused on three topics. First, the discussions helped clarify new Government of Nepal (GON) requests for equipment, which included among other items mine-protected vehicles (MPVs), jeeps, and INSAS rifles. Saran said the GOI would try to be responsive to the new GON requests and may attempt to transfer some MPVs currently in Jharkand to Nepal. (Those vehicles would have to undergo some kind of refurbishment.) Second, since recent Royal Nepal Army (RNA) successes in the field increase the danger of the Maoists modifying their tactics and diverting their attacks to urban environments, the GOI offered to provide training on how to counter urban terrorism, Saran reported. Third, the two governments have agreed to revitalize intelligence exchanges, especially regarding cross-border movement of suspected terrorists. The smooth exchange of information had been hampered in the past because the RNA, which is primarily responsible for border security in Nepal, had no institutional links with the IB, which is responsible for border security in India. The talks addressed how to institutionalize the relationship between the two forces, including setting up formal channels of communication (with secure “”hotlines””) at IB offices in Siliguri, Patna and Lucknow. Communications will be supplemented by regular meetings between representatives of the two security forces at additional local venues as well. Saran added that the GOI plans to increase the number of border security force units along the border with Nepal from 14 to 34.

¶4. (C) After Nepal’s Dashain-Tihar holidays in October, the two governments will pursue conclusion of extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties, Saran said. Talks on this subject over the past few days had gone well, he reported, with many earlier hurdles, including the sticky topic of how to treat third-country nationals, resolved, he reported. Extradition of one’s own nationals remains a sensitive topic, however. In the past, Saran explained, the GOI had regularly turned over suspected Maoists to the GON without a formal treaty–earning criticism from human rights groups and INGOs such as ICRC in the process. The wife of Maoist Central Committee member Bam Dev Chhetri, whom the GOI had handed over in September 2002 (and who was subsequently released by the GON during the ceasefire), has filed a case against the GOI, he noted. An extradition treaty with Nepal would give the GOI a firm legal basis for such transfers in the future.

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INDIAN VIEWS ON US SECURITY ASSISTANCE
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¶5. (C) By having the GON prioritize its security needs, the GOI will be better able to provide assistance, Saran continued. While the GOI has no objection per se to the USG providing M-16 rifles to the RNA, the GOI believes that it is in a better position to provide conventional weapons like rifles to the Nepali military, and that the USG should offer “”high-tech”” equipment and assistance. Ambassador Malinowski replied that while final funding levels remain unknown, the USG is reviewing the possibility of providing refurbished Bell helicopters to the RNA. Saran noted that the GOI may provide a few Indian helicopters as well.

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NO PROGRESS ON POLITICAL FRONT
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¶6. (C) Both Ambassadors agreed that their joint efforts, along with the British Ambassador, to promote a reconciliation between the political parties and the Palace (Ref B) had not so far proven fruitful. The fragile consensus between the political parties is already beginning to unravel, both noted, with the Nepali Congress hinting it will insist that revival of Parliament precede formation of an all-party government and the Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist (UML) hinting it will insist on the exact opposite. Nonetheless, the Ambassadors concurred that the GON will have to reach out to the political parties. Saran reported that he understands that the King may decide to meet the parties to enlist their support and is also considering a possible Cabinet expansion. For now, the GON intends to concentrate on elections, including the possibility of holding staggered local elections next spring, followed by national elections, conducted in phases, beginning in November 2004.

MALINOWSKI

American Cablegate: US Ambassador Relays Concerns About Activities Of Indian Intelligence Agents [In Nepal]

Reference ID: 03KATHMANDU2366

Created: 2003-12-04 02:02
Released: 2011-03-15 00:12
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Origin: Embassy Kathmandu

Wikileaks notice: This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T KATHMANDU 002366

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR SA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2013
TAGS: PREL PTER NP IN
SUBJECT: NEPAL: AMBASSADOR RELAYS CONCERNS ABOUT
ACTIVITIES OF INDIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENTS

REF: A. REF: KATHMANDU 2282
¶B. KATHMANDU 2298

Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).

¶1. (S/NF) On December 3 the Ambassador raised with Indian Ambassador Shyam Saran reports that intelligence agents assigned to the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu have been characterizing USG policy and motives in Nepal as malevolently aimed at undermining Nepal’s sovereignty. The Ambassador told Saran that the reports had been passed to us by several Nepali political sources, who claimed to have had such conversations in the recent past with Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) agents based at the Indian Embassy. He also briefed Saran about unsubstantiated reports suggesting that some Nepali Maoist women may have received training at a security facility in Dehra Dun in northern India (Ref A). Noting that Nepalis, both within the government and in the opposition, sometimes attempt to play off Indian and American interests, he stressed that the information passed on by these sources had not been verified. He noted that the reports predated the meeting between Nepali Maoists and Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist General Secretary Madhav Nepal in Lucknow (Ref B)–an event that has SIPDIS set Nepali nationalists teeth on edge against India. The Ambassador emphasized that he was communicating these concerns to Saran as a friend and ally.

¶2. (S/NF) Ambassador Saran thanked him and expressed concern, describing the reports as “”unfortunate”” and not an accurate reflection of official GOI policy–a point confirmed in his recent policy discussions in New Delhi (see para 3). The GOI is committed to ensuring Nepal’s stability, he said, adding that he has obtained unprecedented levels of development and security assistance for the kingdom. Nonetheless, sometimes people in different branches of the GOI “”go off on their own,”” he acknowledged, and promised to look into the reports.

¶3. (S/NF) In a separate meeting on November 30, Saran briefed the Ambassador on the just-concluded policy deliberations in New Delhi. He stressed that his interlocutors had expressed concern about possible spill-over of the insurgency onto Indian territory. According to Saran, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes told him that “”the fight against the Maoists is also India’s fight.”” Saran noted, however, that certain quarters within the GOI had argued that India should maintain contact with the Maoists in order to influence them and to keep open communication channels in the event of a worst-case scenario in which the Maoists ultimately gain power.

¶4. (S/NF) We cannot discount the possibility that our Nepali sources, many of whom resent India’s influence in their country, may have their own motives in conveying to us reports of Indian double-dealing. We have always found Saran professional, collegial, and cooperative, and believe that he does not sanction–and may probably not be aware of–all of RAW’s activities in Nepal. His acknowledgement that some in the GOI “”go off on their own”” and that some advocate maintaining contact and influence with the Maoists is his first admission to us that some elements within his Embassy may be working at cross-purposes to official GOI policy.

MALINOWSKI

See on Wikileaks

American Cablegate: CRUNCH TIME IN NEPAL?

Reference ID: 06KATHMANDU2587
Created: 2006-09-22 11:11
Released: 2011-03-15 00:12
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Origin: Embassy Kathmandu

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001197

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM MARR IN NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: INDIAN OFFICIALS TAKE TOUGHER STAND ON
MAOISTS

REF: KATHMANDU 1112

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
——-

¶1. (C) On June 15, Indian Ambassador Shiv Shankar Mukherjee confirmed to the Ambassador that the Government of India had taken a tougher line on Maoist abuses. Mukherjee’s recent visit to New Delhi had coincided with the visit of Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist General Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal. According to Mukherjee, who sat in on a June 6 meeting between Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee and MK Nepal, the Foreign Minister had expressed concern that the law and order situation in Nepal continued to deteriorate and Maoist abuses had gone unpunished. Moreover, Foreign Minister Mukherjee had been categorical in his discussion with MK Nepal that the Maoists should not be integrated into the Nepal Army. Ambassador Mukherjee asserted that the GOI would not tolerate continued attempts by the Maoist splinter Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (“”People’s Terai Liberation Front””) (JTMM) to derail the Constituent Assembly election. He agreed that the Maoists had not showed a true commitment to joining the political mainstream.

Indian Foreign Minister Concerned About Maoist Intentions
——————————————— ————

¶2. (C) Indian Ambassador Shiv Shankar Mukherjee told the Ambassador on June 15 that senior Indian officials had voiced concern about ongoing Maoist abuses during Mukherjee’s recent consultations in New Delhi. Similarly, in a meeting between Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Kumar Mukherjee and Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) General Secretary Madav Kumar Nepal on June 6, the Foreign Minister SIPDIS had confirmed that the leadership of the Government of India (GOI) was increasingly concerned with the deteriorating security situation in Nepal. Maoist abuses needed to be punished. Foreign Minister Mukherjee had told MK Nepal that the seven parties in the governing coalition needed to stay united and take clear steps to prepare for free and fair elections in November. This was the only way, FM Mukherjee had opined, to keep the Maoists in the political process. The Foreign Minister had also made it clear to MK Nepal that the GON should not – under any circumstances – integrate Maoist combatants into the Nepal Army.

Home Minister Will Stay On
————————–

¶3. (C) Foreign Minister Mukherjee had hinted to MK Nepal during their meeting, according to Ambassador Mukherjee, that Home Minister Sitaula needed to do more to address the country’s security situation. The Indian Ambassador speculated that Sitaula had dodged a bullet because the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum (MPRF) had retracted its demand for his resignation. Mukherjee acknowledged to the Ambassador that Sitaula was a big part of the problem; unfortunately, he noted, Sitaula would probably stay on as Home Minister.

JTMM Activity Won’t Be Tolerated
——————————–

¶4. (C) Mukherjee agreed with the Ambassador that the Government of Nepal had to take concrete steps to include marginalized groups in the political process. He also noted that the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (“”People’s Terai Liberation Front””) (JTMM) should be brought into discussions and convinced to declare a “”revolutionary cease-fire”” to save face. Mukherjee told the Ambassador that the GOI would do “”everything in its power”” to address the situation if the JTMM tried to derail the Constituent Assembly election. Mukherjee felt that Maoist acts of violence would be the single most destabilizing factor leading up to the election. He asserted that the U.S. should stand firm in its decision

KATHMANDU 00001197 002 OF 002

not to communicate with the Maoists, as doing so would only reward bad behavior.

Maoists Not Invited to New Delhi
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¶5. (S/NF) When asked by the Ambassador whether the Maoists had been invited back to New Delhi for consultations, Ambassador Mukherjee said that officials in New Delhi had refused the informal requests for a visit they had received from Maoist chief Pushpa Kamal Dahal (aka Prachanda). According to Mukherjee, Dahal’s go-betweens were told by the Indian Embassy that it was not the time for a visit to New Delhi because the Maoists had continued to break their commitments to the peace process. The Maoists had reportedly lamented the fact that they had “”lost their former channels”” of communication to New Delhi. In response, GOI officials had made it clear that, since the Maoists had entered into the Interim Government, the intelligence community was no longer their conduit. “”We are the conduit now,”” Ambassador Mukherjee noted, referring to his embassy.

Comment
——-

¶6. (C) The Indian Ambassador continues privately to express much more pessimism about Maoist actions and intentions than in the past (reftel). Mukherjee shared our analysis that the Maoists continue to seek total state power — even if he is not prepared to say so publicly. Foreign Minister Mukherjee’s recent push for CPN-UML leader MK Nepal to maintain seven-party unity and enforce law and order was useful and timely. According to the Indian political counselor, Prime Minister Monmohan Singh was even blunter with MK Nepal, warning him to be wary of the Maoists and urging him to work with Prime Minister Koirala. We hope that a two-pronged message from India and the U.S. could help push the GON to address the current security situation and move quickly toward a November Constituent Assembly election while maintaining guard against Maoist machinations.

MORIARTY

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

Viewing cable 07KATHMANDU1197, NEPAL: INDIAN OFFICIALS TAKE TOUGHER STAND ON

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American Embassy on Wikileaks Cablegate and Nepal

As we are awaiting the disclosure of 2278 cables from the US mission in Kathmandu by Wikileaks the American Ambassador to Nepal Scott H. DeLisi issued a statement today “on the Release of Classified State Department Documents.” Here’s the full text as provided by the US embassy in Kathmandu:

President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton have made it a priority to reinvigorate America’s relationships around the world. They have been working hard to strengthen our existing partnerships and build new ones to meet shared challenges, from climate change to ending the threat of nuclear weapons to fighting disease and poverty. As the United States Ambassador to Nepal, I’m proud to be part of this effort.

Of course, even a solid relationship will have its ups and downs. We have seen that in the past few days, when documents purportedly downloaded from U.S. Defense Department computers became the subject of reports in the media. They appear to contain our diplomats’ assessments of policies, negotiations, and leaders from countries around the world as well as reports on private conversations with people inside and outside other governments.

I cannot vouch for the authenticity of any one of these documents. But I can say that the United States deeply regrets the disclosure of any information that was intended to be confidential. And we condemn it. Diplomats must engage in frank discussions with their colleagues, and they must be assured that these discussions will remain private. Honest dialogue—within governments and between them—is part of the basic bargain of international relations; we couldn’t maintain peace, security, and international stability without it. I’m sure that Nepal’s ambassadors to the United States would say the same thing. They too depend on being able to exchange honest opinions with their counterparts in Washington and send home their assessments of America’s leaders, policies, and actions.

I do believe that people of good faith recognize that diplomats’ internal reports do not represent a government’s official foreign policy. In the United States, they are one element out of many that shape our policies, which are ultimately set by the President and the Secretary of State. And those policies are a matter of public record, the subject of thousands of pages of speeches, statements, white papers, and other documents that the State Department makes freely available online and elsewhere.

But relations between governments aren’t the only concern. U.S. diplomats meet with local human rights workers, journalists, religious leaders, and others outside the government who offer their own candid insights. These conversations depend on trust and confidence as well. If an anti-corruption activist shares information about official misconduct, or a social worker passes along documentation of sexual violence, revealing that person’s identity could have serious repercussions: imprisonment, torture, even death.

The owners of the WikiLeaks website claim to possess some 250,000 classified documents, many of which have been released to the media. Whatever their motives are in publishing these documents, it is clear that releasing them poses real risks to real people, and often to particular people who have dedicated their lives to protecting others. An act intended to provoke the powerful may instead imperil the powerless. We support and are willing to have genuine debates about pressing questions of public policy. But releasing documents carelessly and without regard for the consequences is not the way to start such a debate.

For our part, the U.S. government is committed to maintaining the security of our diplomatic communications and is taking steps to make sure they are kept in confidence. We are moving aggressively to make sure this kind of breach does not happen again. And we will continue to work to strengthen our partnership with Nepal and make progress on the issues that are important for our two countries. We can’t afford anything less. President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and I remain committed to being trusted partners as we seek to build a better, more prosperous world for everyone.