Tag Archives: india

General Rana’s Political and Undiplomatic Statement

Update: The Nepali Army today issued a press statement claiming that comments attributed to him are false and that he didn’t give any formal interview to any news outlets during his trip to India last week.

“The news reports published in a few media outlets in the past few days that Chief of the Army Mr Rana gave interview commenting upon the security of Nepal and neighboring countries and issues related to that are inaccurate and misleading. As Chief of the Army Mr Rana, during the week-long visit, didn’t give any types of formal interview to the media those comments, it seems, those comments have been disseminated out of context.

“Nepali Army is a professional and apolitical organization that, while remaining within constitutional authority, respects civil supremacy. There is no possibility of Nepali Army or the leadership of the Nepali Army passing comments of such irresponsible nature. It is to let all know that the military leadership hasn’t made such comments.”

UWB note: The Nepal Army statement, worded in Nepali, is a very badly written note with confusing sentence structure- as if it were a work of a liar who unexpectedly found himself/herself in a police interrogation room. If Mr Rana didn’t give any formal interview, were his comments published in the Times of India informally provided to the reporter? The Nepali Army statement seems to be implying that as it states Rana didn’t give any FORMAL interview to any news outlet and that news reports and commentaries seem to have come out of context (so what was the context?). Nepali Army may still be apolitical, professional and under civilian control as claimed in the Army statement but we refused to believe that the same can be said to the army leadership- namely Gaurav Rana. He should come clean.

Was it merely a slip of the tongue or our Army chief actually wanted to show how childish he can be when it comes to dealing with international issues? Was he intending to appease the Indians (if yes, he failed to do so) and hurt our relationship with the Chinese? If he fancies working as a political/strategic commentator for Indian newspapers, he should first resign from the post of the Chief of the Army Staff and cross over to India. Also, you can’t be a spokesperson (a bad one) of the Indian Army while still holding the top position at the Nepali Army.

Continue reading

About these ads

The Pain of Losing a Nation. Story of Lhendup Dorji and Sikkim

In his Op-Ed article published in today’s Kantipur (See below or here, former minister and RPP leader Dr Prakash Chandra Lohani compares Prime Minister Dr Baburam Bhattarai with Kazi Lhendup Dorji. For those who don’t know who Lhendup Dorji is, here is his obit written (title: The Pain of Losing a Nation) in 2007. [सिक्किम विलयबारे नेपालीमा यहाँ पढ्न पाइन्छ। अनि यो कान्तिपुर  लेख- माओवादी-भारत सम्बन्ध: पहिले विस्तारवाद, अहिले अवसरवाद]

By Sudheer Sharma

(September 2007) The last Prime Minister of the Himalayan Kingdom of Sikkim, Kazi Lhendup Dorji, met an ignominious Death.

On the northern corner of West Bengal state of India, there is a hill station – Kalimpong, which once hosted celebrities from all over the world. The hill town, where most of the settlers are of Nepali origin, no longer retains its old charm. But until a few weeks ago the last prime minister of a country – that has lost its independence – used to live here. Kazi Lhendup Dorji, who died on 28 July this year [2007] at the ripe old age of 103, had played a pivotal role in the merger of Sikkim into India.

Dorji is seen as a ‘traitor’ in the contemporary history. He lived, and died, with the same ignominy. “Everybody accuses me of selling the country. Even if it is true, should I alone be blamed?” he asked me, when I met him in Kalimpong in November 1996. But the allegation of ‘betrayal’ towards one’s own motherland was so powerful that Dorji could no more lead an active political life. He spent his solitary life at the ‘Chakung House’ in Kalimpong for several decades. Few people chose to remember Kazi when he passed away nor took pain to recall his life and times.

So much so that the Kazi was ignored even by Delhi. “I went out of my way to ensure the merger of Sikkim into India but after the work was done, the Indians just ignored me”, Kazi told me during an interview for Jana Astha weekly, nearly 11 years ago. “Earlier, I used to be given a ‘Red Carpet’ welcome. Now I have to wait for weeks even to meet second grade leaders.” Continue reading

Prime Minister Baburam in India: Agreements Signed and Some Photos Clicked

Baburam Bhattarai and Man Mohan Singh

Baburam Bhattarai and Man Mohan Singh

Nepal, India ink two major deals including BIPPA

  • BIPPA a calculated gamble: PM

By Akhilesh Upadhyay and Mahesh Acharya
in The Kathmandu Post

Nepal and India singed two major agreements, including the much-talked about Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA), here late on Friday (yesterday). This brings to a close days of hectic negotiations and speculations over the fate of BIPPA, which India has sought to protect security for its investments in Nepal.

Minster for Industry Anil Kumar Jha and Indian Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement at Hyderabad House, the government venue for high-level negotiations in India. Prime Minister Baburam Bhattrai and his counterpart Manmohan Singh were present at the signing.

The two sides also agreed to a $250-million line of credit to finance infrastructure projects such as highways, airports and bridges. The credit line was announced during President Ram Baran Yadav’s state visit to Delhi last year. In the run-up to the visit, PM Bhattarai is known to have pitched for a $1 billion and was expecting even more, government sources said. India responded positively, according to officials. Continue reading

Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai’s India Trip

baburam bhattarai india trip

By Akhilesh Upadhyay
in the Kathmandu Post

OCT 20 – No visit by a Nepali Prime Minister to New Delhi has generated as much attention as that of Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s in September 2008. There was a good reason.

His party CPN (Maoist), underground only until two years ago, had thumped traditional powerhouses in their first open elections. Though Maoist leaders and India’s Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) had worked closely to make the 12-point agreement between the Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) possible, people in New Delhi were still not sure how the force that had historically regarded India as “expansionist” would respond in New Delhi. Continue reading

American Diplomatic Cable: Indians, Allergic to Police Advisor Reference, Wanted to Change UN Resolution on Mission In Nepal

2007-01-18 12:27

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000104

SIPDIS
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/INS, IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017

TAGS: PREL PGOV NP UN

SUBJECT: NEPAL: INDIANS WANT POLICE ADVISORS,
EXPLOSIVES OUT OF DRAFT UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
——-

¶1. (C) Indian Ambassador Mukherjee requested a meeting with
the Ambassador January 18 to relay New Delhi’s concern with
references in the draft UN Security Resolution (UNSCR) on
Nepal to police advisors as well as the U.S.-proposed clause
on explosive devices. Ambassador Mukherjee said that, while
India would not block the presence of UN police advisors, it
did not want the advisors explicitly mentioned in the
resolution, citing the potential for mission creep and UN
“intrusiveness” in a Nepal-led election process. Mukherjee
also said India preferred that language on mines, improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), and unexploded ordinance be
omitted. These arms management details were already included
in the prior November 28 Agreement on the Management of Arms
and Armies, he said. Ambassador Mukherjee reiterated India’s
goal of a focused and limited UN Mission in Nepal with
ownership of the peace process firmly in the hands of the
Nepali Government. Both Ambassadors agreed that speedy
finalization of a resolution was critical for success of arms
management, and that small details in the draft UNSCR’s
language should not get in the way of its rapid adoption. Continue reading

American Diplomatic Cable: US Criticizes India for Unfairly Treating Nepal

…we remain deeply concerned over India’s apparent unwillingness to collaborate fully in regional efforts which stand to bring much-needed, long-term benefit to poverty-stricken Nepal.

2003-03-04 04:50 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000382 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR SA DAS DON CAMP, SA/INS, AND SA/RA
STATE PLEASE PASS AID/ANE - D MCCLUSKEY, C LOWRY, G
WEYNAND, J WILSON
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL
NSC FOR E MILLARD 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2008
TAGS: EAID ECIN ENRG PREL
SUBJECT: INDO-NEPAL CROSS-BORDER ENERGY TRADE STAGNATES 

REF: KATHMANDU 314 

Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs, for reasons 1.5(b) and (d). 

ś1.  (C) SUMMARY: Nepal's Minister for Water Resources Dipak
Gyawali is sharply critical of India's policies on
cross-border energy trade.  He told us that he believes New
Delhi focuses on the strategic aspects of water and energy to
the exclusion of economics.  Despite Nepal's current power
surplus, Gyawali understands that Nepal will need to develop
storage capacity in the future, in addition to slated
run-of-the-river projects, in order to compensate for the
high seasonal variability of water flows.  He believes that
joint venture models have the greatest potential for tapping
Nepal's huge hydroelectric potential.  In our view, India's
resistance to joining South Asian regional initiatives is
holding back the economic development of both countries and
will impede national as well as donor-funded efforts to
alleviate South Asia's poverty.  Please see action request
for Department and Embassy New Delhi in final paragraph.  End
Summary.

Continue reading

American Diplomatic Cable: Moriarty Meets Girija Prasad Koirala, Complains Against Home Minister Sitaula

2006-06-05 12:02

S E C R E T KATHMANDU 001432

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IN NP
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON UPCOMING NEW
DELHI VISIT

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES F. MORIARTY, REASONS 1.4 (B/D).

Summary
——-

¶1. (S/NF) Ambassador Moriarty, accompanied by A/DCM Schwartz
met June 5 with Prime Minister G.P Koirala and Senior Foreign
Policy Adviser Chalise on the eve of the Prime Minister,s
upcoming visit to New Delhi. Although press accounts have
speculated that the trip will focus on economic and trade
matters, the Prime Minister immediately volunteered that he
had only one goal for his visit ) to obtain Government of
India (GoI) consent to participation of a “witness” in the
Nepal peace process. Gaunt and repeatedly coughing, the Prime
Minister asked the Ambassador to inform Washington of his
desire to firmly draw the Maoists into the peace process,
while foreclosing Maoist military threats and containing
potentially recalcitrant Nepal Army (NA) elements by engaging
a credible and independent group of foreign witnesses,
preferably including India and the United Nations. End
Summary. Continue reading

Nepal Army Senior Officers Corrupt: Indian Ambassador to American Officials

In a meeting with American officials on 11 March, 2006 in Kathmandu the then Indian Ambassador to Nepal Shiv Shankar Mukherjee had asserted that corruption in the then Royal Nepal Army (now Nepal Army) was high and the senior commanders were “content to acquire arms on the black or gray market” because that was profitable arrangement for them than the government to government deal. “Senior officers were enriching themselves with funds set aside for procurement,” Mukherjee told the US officials. “They had told the Chinese to up their invoices for small arms by 30 percent.” The Indian ambassador said that the situation in the RNA was bad in view of poor leadership, poor training and low morale. Even foreign countries provided up to ten times more ammunition than provided previously, the army would not be able to defeat the insurgency.  Mukherjee claimed that the corruption factor explained why the RNA leadership had not been overly concerned about India, the UK and the US cutting off arms shipments.

[Then Army Chief Pyar Jung Thapa had acknowledged an acute shortage of ammunition during his meeting with the US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia, Donald Camp, in March 2006.]
- Phanindra Dahal

Here’s the full text of the US diplomatic cable: Continue reading

Tracking the Indian Ambassador in Nepal: Jayant Prasad

Jayant Prasad Indian Ambassador in Nepal

The new Indian Ambassador to Nepal, Jayant Prasad, presented his letter of credentials to President Dr Ram Baran Yadav on 26 August.

Ambassadors are the most visible faces of Indian diplomacy in Nepal and they are not always thought to be pursuing diplomacy. Some, like the current ambassador Jayant Prasad’s immediate predecessor Rakesh Sood, was widely believed to be one of the worst examples of Indian intervention and failed diplomacy in Nepal. While in India (or in their Ministry of External Affairs) these people are normal employees, diplomats who don’t attract much attention unless they are involved in major scandal or become foreign secretary. But as soon as they land in Kathmandu with the coveted portfolio of the Indian ambassador for Nepal they become celebrities. Media extensively covers the Indian Ambassadors movements and decisions in Nepal and give high priority to anything that is related to an Indian envoy. That is largely because the Indian ambassadors “implement” the enormously influential Indian policy in Nepal- some by diplomatically and some by offensively interventionist ways.  Rarely in the world ambassadors get to hobnob with prime ministers and top leaders of a host country like the Indian ambassadors do with the Nepali leadership. Because of all these factors, we at UWB have decided to keep track of the Indian ambassador in Kathmandu as far as possible. Here are some headlines  that give enough idea about the arrival of the current ambassador and his activities in the first week since he assumed office in August 26.

Continue reading

American Cablegate: US-Indian Cooperation And Military Assistance to Nepal

Viewing cable 03KATHMANDU280, US-INDIAN COOPERATION AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Reference ID: 03KATHMANDU280
Created: 2003-02-14 05:05
Released: 2011-03-15 00:12
Classification:SECRET//NOFORN
Origin: Embassy Kathmandu

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 000280

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IN NP
SUBJECT: US-INDIAN COOPERATION AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NEPAL

REF: A. A. 02 NEW DELHI 6938 B. B. NEW DELHI 267 C. C. NEW DELHI 641

Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION ROBERT K. BOGGS. REASONS: 1.5 (B AND D)

¶1. (C) Summary: US security assistance to Nepal has brought the ancillary advantage to the US of providing a new arena for fruitful US-Indian dialogue and collaboration. Top Indian diplomats in Kathmandu clearly appreciate not only US support for common US-Indian security objectives in Nepal, but also the unprecedented frequency and candor of our bilateral discussions of Nepal-related issues. Indian military intelligence officers in Kathmandu, however, are openly and persistently uncomfortable with US sales of lethal equipment — and M16s in particular — to the Royal Nepal Army. The following describes a recent discussion with Indian civilian and military officers that provides some insights into varied Indian attitudes toward US security policy here. Embassy Kathmandu remains convinced that US and UK arms sales to Nepal — although modest in quantity and basic in technology — have played a disproportionately influential role in persuading Maoist leaders to agree to a cease-fire and negotiations with the Government of Nepal (GON). We believe our security assistance policy remains valid, and that it offers a continuing opportunity to reinforce growing US-Indian mil-mil cooperation and engender greater bilateral confidence. Positive Indian involvement clearly is key to any longer-term resolution of Nepal’s political and security problems, so it is important that US diplomacy with India accelerate along with our security assistance to this beleaguered kingdom. End summary.

¶2. (C) DCM and DATT met on February 4 with their Indian counterparts to discuss issues raised by the Indian Ambassador concerning US sales of M16 rifles to Nepal. Indian Ambassador Shyam Saran had asked Ambassador Malinowski several days earlier what plans the US had for providing assault rifles to the Royal Nepal Army (RNA). He needed to know how many rifles the US plans eventually to provide, he explained, because he could not justify India’s continuing to supply INSAS rifles if the US were planning to meet Nepal’s needs in this regard. Although Ambassador Malinowski, the DCM and our DATT meet frequently with their Indian counterparts, and have developed unprecedented transparency in their discussions of such formerly sensitive issues as security assistance, this was the first time the DCM and DATT had participated in a joint meeting at the Indian Embassy.

¶3. (C) DCM and DATT began the discussion by explaining the complexity of the US security assistance process, emphasizing that none of the money appropriated in FY 02 for security assistance for Nepal has yet been spent on any military hardware or training. So far, they explained, the USG has committed only to selling the RNA — using GON funds — two orders each of 5000 M16s. The remaining 2000 rifles of the first order (which was submitted by the RNA in May 2002) should be delivered in the next month or two, but the delivery date of the second 5000 is still uncertain. Although the Nepali press persists in reporting that the US eventually with provide 55,000 rifles, this has not been agreed. The DCM pointed out that the US has committed also to providing night vision devices, pilot protective gear, and communication equipment, but these non-lethal items have not been manufactured yet and might take a year or two to deliver. In contrast, the DATT and DCM pointed out, the Government of India (GOI) has been providing Nepal with an accelerating stream of rifles and other military equipment. In our view, India’s leading role in providing military assistance to Nepal is consistent with its proximity, long history of assistance, and strong strategic interest in the security of the Himalayan region. The DCM underscored that the US appreciates India’s leading role, encourages it, and has no competing long-term military objectives here.

¶4. (C) The Indian DCM, Ashok Kumar, agreed readily with the DCM’s characterization of the speed and volume of Indian security assistance to Nepal. He asserted proudly that the more encouraging military situation on the ground in the RNA’s fight with the Maoists was due completely to Indian assistance. Kumar took pointed exception to the DATT’s reference to GOI “”objections”” to US sales of M16s to Nepal. The GOI, he stressed, has no “”objections;”” it has only “”concerns.”” The GOI, he explained, is meeting the RNA’s every request for lethal equipment. It would thus make more sense, he argued, for the US to let India provide arms and concentrate instead on such equipment as night vision devices and helicopters where the US has the comparative advantage. If, however, the US intends to provide rifles, the GOI could not ask Indian taxpayers to subsidize the continuing supply to Nepal of more arms than it could effectively utilize. The DCM explained (again) that the sale of M16s was based on a PACOM assessment in April 2002 of Nepal’s most urgent military needs. If India is planning to fill those needs in the near term, the USG is prepared to revise the profile of its out-year assistance to take account of changing requirements after we meet our current obligations. The Indians refused firmly to provide specific numbers on how many INSAS rifles the GOI planned to provide. Kumar asserted that “”numbers are not important,”” and that he had no interest in getting into “”a numbers game””.

¶5. (C) The DCM and DATT countered by explaining that the USG is not pushing M16s on the Nepali Government. After our current FMF appropriation was approved in mid-2002, we asked the RNA leadership how it wanted to prioritize the use of that money — within the parameters set by the PACOM assessment. The RNA was emphatic in reiterating its request that the lion’s share of the appropriation be spent on M16s, along with some non-lethal equipment and training. The RNA was familiar with the M16 from international peacekeeping operations, knew it to be a reliable weapon, and felt that its induction into RNA ranks would be a major morale-booster. The ammunition for the M16A2, moreover, is not available in the region and is difficult to obtain on the South Asian black market, so M16s would be less problematic than Indian-manufactured weapons if they were to fall into the hands of the Maoists or Indian extremists. The DCM and DATT reiterated that the US has made no commitment to supplying all the RNA’s needs for a modern combat rifle or any other arms. We see our modest M16 sales only as a supplement to the rifles being supplied by India. With the RNA expanding rapidly toward 70,000 soldiers, its need for rifles is greater than either of our governments is likely to meet in the short term. The RNA’s decision to standardize on a few weapons from different sources was not unusual or unreasonable; in fact, this is something India itself is doing (with its purchases of specialized rifles from the US and Israel.)

¶6. (C) The DATT asked how the GOI proposed that the USG should approach the M16 issue with Nepal. After a pause with no answer from the Indians, the DATT asked whether they would want us to inform the RNA that after the current order for M16s is filled, Nepal should turn all its arms to India? Kumar again avoided giving a recommendation. He was, however, quick and categorical in rejecting the DATT’s proposal, stating that the Indian supply relationship should not become a subject for US-Nepal dialogue. Clearly, he said, the issue of arms purchases was one the Nepal Government would have to decide for itself. India would have to resolve its own assistance issues by talking directly to the Nepalis.

¶7. (C) In conclusion the DCM pointed out that the US values its strengthening military-to-military relationship with India and has no desire to complicate it with our security assistance to Nepal. On the contrary, our two governments recognize our common interests in helping Nepal to defeat its Maoist threat. The growing frequency and candor of our discussions of Nepal-related security issues are an important benefit of our improved cooperation. Nepal thus is becoming a theater for bilateral strategic cooperation rather than of competition. The Indian DCM had no final comment to offer on M16 sales and made no explicit recommendation. He concluded on a positive note by saying that we should continue our dialogue.

¶8. (S/NF) Comment: Our frequent discussions with our Indian diplomatic colleagues here in Kathmandu are inconsistent in tone. Ambassador Shyam Saran is an unusually able professional who is comfortable sharing his well-informed political and security analyses of Nepal with our Ambassador and official visitors. We find that we agree in large measure with his views, including his profound skepticism about the motives of the Maoists and his emphasis on the importance of the legal political parties supporting the government. Saran has raised questions about US arms supplies to Nepal, but without complaints or threats. DCM Kumar, an often abrasive diplomat whose pursuit of Indian interests borders on chauvinism, has become more collegial and less plaintive as we have engaged him more frequently in discussions of US security policy in Nepal. Only Defense Attache George Mathai, a long-time Gurkha officer, continues to press our DATT to minimize lethal sales to Nepal, obviously delivering prepared talking points without the benefit of supporting information.

¶9. (C) On February 11 our DATT was told that the Indian Embassy had placed a hold on the delivery of additional INSAS rifles, although the Embassy had not informed the GON yet of that. According to the DATT’s source, the GON planned eventually to transfer the Indian-made rifles to the Nepalese Armed Police, and the Embassy did not want them to recommend that more rifles be diverted from Indian forces for the subsidiary purpose. AMB Saran has confirmed this freeze on further INSAS sales, assuring us that this step was taken not in response to US arms sales, but because he believed the GON was not being candid with the GOI regarding its need for and intended use of Indian-made rifles.

¶10. Conclusions we tentatively have drawn from the discussion summarized above and numerous others like it are the following:

– (C) The GOI, like the USG, is attempting to be responsive to Nepali requests for modern combat rifles as an urgent priority. What is frustrating to the Indians is that the Nepalis have never requested India to meet their complete needs for rifles, and have indicated a preference for the M16 as their front-line weapon. For many reasons — diplomatic, economic, military and psychological — the GOI would like the RNA to be totally dependent on it for arms, although the GOI is itself moving toward some foreign military sourcing for small arms.

– (C) Indian analysts are increasingly persuaded that the Maoist movement in Nepal poses a security threat to India. Their dilemma is that they have wider and deeper interests in a secure Nepal than any other nation, but their influence in the Kingdom is constrained by a long history of bilateral tension and suspicion. Objective observers increasingly acknowledge that US security assistance and diplomatic support in Nepal are helpful for the realization of Indian objectives here during this time of turmoil.

– (C) Indian attitudes toward US security assistance to Nepal are complex. On the one hand, they are pleased by the growing transparency and collegiality of our bilateral dialogue on Nepal. On the other hand, some GOI elements here apparently are having difficulty coming to terms with growing US and UK military activism in Nepal as a conspicuous dilution of the dominance in military assistance that India has long enjoyed and defended. — (C) Given the tensions already present in Indo-Nepal relations, Indian diplomats here want assiduously to avoid complicating those relations by allowing them to become tripartite — with the US openly becoming an interlocutor in the shaping of the Indo-Nepal security relationship. We suspect that the reported decision of the GOI to hold up INSAS deliveries is another attempt by India to remind Nepal of the extent to which it is beholden to India without explicitly mentioning US arms sales.

– (S/NF) At least in Kathmandu, Indian concern about US arms sales to Nepal appears to vary significantly between its civilian and military representatives. Indian diplomats understand the importance to India of enhanced US-Indian defense collaboration, and do not want to jeopardize that, and their own dialogue with us, over so small an issue. Indian military intelligence officers, on the other hand, appear to be more focused on traditional relations and local military equations, and have been more willing to signal their discomfort about our potential competition.

¶11. (C) Comment. The best information we have seen on Maoist thinking indicates that the US and UK’s announced policy of military assistance to the GON, coupled with the first deliveries of our M16 and British-purchased helicopters, has been a major consideration in persuading the Maoist leadership to opt for a cease-fire and political negotiations. The GON has made it clear that, despite eventual peace talks, US steadfastness in providing military support — and M16s in particular — will be an important factor in keeping the Maoists at the negotiating table. Obviously, the positive exercise of Indian military aid and political influence is absolutely key to a final resolution of Nepal’s complex political and security problems. Embassy applauds efforts in New Delhi and Washington (see, for example, Delhi’s useful cable, reftel) to strengthen our constructive dialogue with India on Nepal, and intends to redouble our efforts here to build on our new strategic relationship with India as we press forward with our arms assistance to Nepal.

MALINOWSKI
[US Ambassador to Kathmandu, Nepal- Michale E. Malinowski]
Cable originally leaked by Wikileaks.